ផែនការយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រសន្តិសុខជាតិកម្ពុជា

 Overview of Cambodia's National Security Strategy Plan



Cambodia's national security strategy plan is embedded within a series of interconnected policy frameworks that emphasize sovereignty, stability, and resilience amid regional and global challenges. The core documents include the 2022 Defence White Paper (DWP), which serves as the foundational long-term vision for defense and security up to 2030, and the 2024 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which provides a mid-term review and adaptation to emerging threats. These are complemented by the Pentagonal Strategy - Phase I (2023–2028), a broader governmental blueprint that integrates security with economic and social development goals, aiming for upper-middle-income status by 2030 and high-income by 2050. The plan adopts a pragmatic, multi-layered approach, prioritizing border defense, internal stability, non-traditional threats, and international cooperation, while navigating great power rivalries through "loose alignment." Recent developments, such as the 2025 cooperation plan with Vietnam on transnational crimes and the nascent National Implementation Action Plan for UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (on non-proliferation), reflect adaptive planning for 2025 and beyond. Additionally, Cambodia is developing its first National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) in 2025, incorporating gender perspectives into security planning.



The strategy plan is reviewed triennially, with resource allocation targeting a defense budget increase to 2.5% of GDP by 2025 and 2.7% by 2030, focusing on modernization and self-reliance. It aligns with sectoral policies like the National Social Protection Policy Framework (updated to 2024–2035) for crisis resilience and the Industrial Development Policy 2015–2025 for economic security linkages.


Threat Assessment in the Strategy Plan



The plan identifies evolving threats, with the 2024 DSU highlighting global instability from conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, potential South China Sea flashpoints, and US-China competition as key risks. Domestically, it addresses "color revolutions," disinformation, cyber threats, terrorism, pandemics, climate change, and transnational crimes like human trafficking. Regional border disputes, including post-July 2025 tensions with Thailand, underscore the need for enhanced maritime and land defenses. Economic vulnerabilities, such as supply chain disruptions, are newly prioritized, linking security to growth under the Pentagonal Strategy.



Threat Category :  Key Elements in Plan :   Timeline for Mitigation



Geopolitical : Great power rivalries, South China Sea tensions  Ongoing through 2030; annual ASEAN engagements.


Regional : Border clashes (e.g., Thailand, Vietnam)  Immediate diplomacy; infrastructure upgrades by 2025.


Internal/Non-Traditional : Cyber attacks, disasters, subversion  Legal frameworks and training by 2028; WPS integration in 2025.


Economic  :  Supply disruptions, transnational crimes  Tied to Pentagonal Phase I; 2025 Vietnam coop plan.


Key Components of the Strategy Plan


The plan outlines actionable pillars with specific implementation measures:


Border and Territorial Security: Focuses on modernizing the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) through infrastructure like Ream Naval Base upgrades and radar systems, funded partly by China. The "Mine-Free Cambodia 2025" initiative is a milestone, with joint patrols and diplomacy for dispute resolution.


Internal Stability and Reform: Includes RCAF restructuring, conscription enhancements, and counter-subversion measures. The Pentagonal Strategy emphasizes social protection for resilience, expanding during crises like pandemics.


Non-Traditional and Emerging Threats: Plans for cybersecurity laws, AI integration in defense, and HA/DR capabilities. The 1540 Action Plan targets WMD non-proliferation by mid-2025, a first in ASEAN.




Economic and Human Security: Links defense to industrial policy, aiming for skill-driven growth by 2025. Social protection frameworks ensure income security, with WFP's 2024–2028 plan supporting food security.



Resource and Capability Building: Targets self-reliant defense industry, human resource development, and peacekeeping expansion (e.g., increasing female participation per WPS plan).


Implementation is phased: short-term (2024–2025) for immediate threats like border security; medium-term (2026–2030) for modernization; long-term (2030–2050) aligned with Cambodia Vision 2050.


International Relations and Cooperation in the Plan


The plan emphasizes multilateralism via ASEAN, UN, and bilateral ties. Cambodia's foreign policy prioritizes neutrality while fostering relations with China for aid and the US for counterterrorism, despite strains over governance. Key partnerships include Australia-Cambodia Development Plan 2025–2029 for capacity building and Vietnam's 2025 security cooperation for joint investigations. The US Integrated Country Strategy (updated 2024) seeks to counter PRC influence through economic support, while Cambodia pursues "accommodation" strategies for reputation enhancement.


Challenges and Implementation Outlook


Challenges include budget constraints, overreliance on China, unresolved borders, and democratic concerns limiting Western aid. The plan's success hinges on diversification, with positive outlook if integrated with Pentagonal goals—projecting a resilient RCAF by 2030 and regional stability role by 2050. Psychological defense against disinformation is emerging as a 2025 imperative.

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