ខណៈពេលដែលលោក Trump មានអំនួតអំពីការបញ្ចប់សង្រ្គាម ប្រទេសចិនធ្វើការយ៉ាងស្ងៀមស្ងាត់ឆ្ពោះទៅរកសន្តិភាព

 China’s handling of Myanmar’s border incursions and efforts towards the Cambodia-Thai ceasefire stand in stark contrast to the US approach

With US President Donald Trump’s unabashed claim of ending eight wars in eight months hogging the limelight, China’s handling of both intrusions along its border with Myanmar and the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute has gone relatively unnoticed.

In stark contrast to America’s dramatic and forceful brokering of peace deals, Beijing has adopted a calibrated and generally reactive response to Myanmar’s border intrusions and supports Asean taking the lead on the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute resolution.

The Myanmar military has intruded into China on a number of occasions. In August 2009, an artillery shell landed in Yunnan, killing one Chinese and injuring several others; another in January 2013 caused neither death nor injury. A more serious intrusion occurred in March 2015 when a bomb discharged from a Myanmar aircraft killed five Chinese and injured eight others.

Adopting a calibrated and largely restrained approach, Beijing expressed concern over the August 2009 and January 2013 incidents but did not overreact. It urged the parties involved to exercise restraint, resolve their differences through talks and maintain peace and stability along the China-Myanmar border.

Unsurprisingly, Beijing took a firmer stance on the more serious 2015 intrusion. It swiftly dispatched fighter jets to patrol the border and step up protection of Chinese air space. Fan Changlong, then vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, called on Myanmar to recognise the seriousness of the issue, punish the perpetrators, apologise to and compensate the victims’ families, and provide an explanation to China.

Tensions dialled down significantly after Wunna Maung Lwin, then Myanmar’s foreign minister, visited Beijing in April that year to formally apologise, pledging to follow up with compensation to the affected Chinese families. He was accompanied by lieutenant general Aung Than Htut, then commander of the Bureau of Special Operations in the office of the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar army.

Clearly, Beijing does not regard the border intrusions as an act of aggression but rather as a result of the spillover of the internal conflict in Myanmar which is best addressed through negotiations. And from the broader standpoint of China-Myanmar relations and border security and stability, Beijing has repeatedly reached out to both the Myanmar government/military and ethnic armed organisations to facilitate talks.

This occurred in February 2013 when China brokered talks between Myanmar’s government and the Kachin Independence Army in the border town of Ruili in Yunnan. Those involved in the talks reportedly included officials from China’s foreign and defence ministries as well as the Yunnan provincial government.

After the 2021 Myanmar military coup, Beijing again mediated between Myanmar’s military and the country’s ethnic armed organisations. In particular, after the Three Brotherhood Alliance – which includes the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army – launched a coordinated offensive against the Myanmar military in October 2023, China stepped in to mediate, leading to a ceasefire in January last year and another in January this year.

In July, as intense fighting erupted between Cambodia and Thailand, China urged the two neighbours to resolve their differences through dialogue and consultation for a lasting peace.

Beijing also stressed its fair and impartial stance as it did not want to be seen as favouring either side. On top of its “ironclad” relationship with Cambodia, there were reports Phnom Penh used Chinese weapons such as rocket launching systems and rounds, as well as artillery shells, against Thailand.

A People’s Liberation Army representative had to assure Thailand that China had not provided any military equipment to Cambodia for use against Thailand since the onset of hostilities, adding that all Chinese military hardware in Cambodia’s possession were the result of past cooperation.

More significantly, the border conflict risks evolving into a proxy war pitting China against the United States. Thailand is a US treaty ally and has used US weaponry, most notably F-16 fighter jets, against Cambodia. If the conflict worsens, Beijing may be forced to provide direct military aid to Cambodia. Even worse, the US could strengthen its presence in Thailand, which Beijing is against.

Beijing therefore supports the Association of Southeast Asian Nations playing a leading role on the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute. As the Asean chair, Malaysia brokered a ceasefire agreement between Cambodia and Thailand in July – China sees this as an important step in calming the tense situation.

China is content to play a constructive role via hosting either informal or formal talks involving Cambodian, Malaysian and/or Thai representatives. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has also pledged China’s support in carrying out activities to defuse tensions such as the clearing of mines in the border areas.

The ceasefire signing ceremony in Kuala Lumpur in July, with both Chinese and American representatives watching from the sidelines, was a win for China as it was able to share the limelight with the US. At the peace deal signing in October, however, China was glaringly absent.

Beijing’s interest is best served by the relevant parties bearing the primary responsibility of resolving their differences. Additionally, China would not wish to see the Myanmar military in Naypyidaw lose power as this would throw the country into deeper chaos and instability. Hence, it is likely to continue to facilitate talks between the Myanmar military and the country’s ethnic armed organisations.

As for the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute, much work remains to ensure peace endures. In this regard, China will want to continue to help the two countries manage their issue.

SCMP