បទ​វិភាគ៖ តើ​កម្ពុជា​អាច​អនុញ្ញាត​ឲ្យ​មាន​មូលដ្ឋាន​ទ័ព​អាមេរិក​ដោយ​របៀប​ណា?

 Analysis: How Cambodia Can Allow US Military Bases



Cambodia's strategic position in Southeast Asia, coupled with its ongoing border conflict with Thailand as of August 2025, has raised questions about potential US military involvement, including the possibility of hosting US bases. However, Cambodia's 1993 Constitution explicitly prohibits foreign military bases on its soil (Article 53), a stance repeatedly emphasized by Cambodian officials in response to concerns over Chinese activities at Ream Naval Base. Despite this, historical precedents, legal loopholes, and geopolitical shifts suggest pathways for Cambodia to accommodate US military presence without formally violating its constitution. Below is a structured analysis based on current events, legal frameworks, and regional dynamics.


1. Legal and Constitutional Workarounds


Rotational or Temporary Access Instead of Permanent Bases: Cambodia has used this approach with China at Ream Naval Base, describing it as a "joint logistics and training center" rather than a permanent foreign base. Similarly, for the US, access could be framed as "rotational deployments" for joint exercises, humanitarian aid, or disaster response. For instance, in March 2025, Cambodia welcomed US Navy visits to Sihanoukville port after an eight-year hiatus, calling it a "goodwill mission." This could evolve into regular US ship docking at Ream or other facilities, as Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol stated in October 2024 that "any navy can call on that port" post-renovation.


Joint Facilities and Training Programs: By labeling infrastructure as Cambodian-owned but jointly operated, Phnom Penh could invite US forces for "training" or "modernization" programs. Recent examples include the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) hosting Cambodian delegations in July 2025 for bilateral defense dialogues focused on joint training and professional military education. This mirrors Cambodia's defense convergence with China, where upgrades at Ream are portrayed as mutual benefits rather than exclusive access.



UN or Multilateral Frameworks: The constitution allows foreign military presence under UN auspices. Cambodia could justify US involvement through UN peacekeeping or regional stability initiatives, especially amid the Thai-Cambodia conflict. In August 2025, Cambodia invited US monitoring of the ceasefire using American military and intelligence assets, inserting the US into the dispute without establishing a "base."



2. Geopolitical Motivations and Incentives


Countering Regional Threats: The 2025 Thai-Cambodia border war, sparked by disputes over temples like Preah Vihear and resources in the Gulf of Thailand, has pushed Cambodia toward the US for support. Thailand, a US treaty ally with access to American-made F-16s and historical hosting of US forces (e.g., during the Vietnam War), holds a military edge. Cambodian social media and officials have accused Thailand of violating US end-user agreements by using F-16s against Cambodian targets. Hosting US presence could deter Thai aggression, as seen in calls from Cambodian users on X for "US military bases in Cambodia to prevent aggression from neighboring countries."



Balancing China and the US: Under Prime Minister Hun Manet (a West Point graduate), Cambodia has pivoted toward Washington since 2024, including visits by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and resumed military exchanges. This "smart and flexible diplomacy" allows Cambodia to hedge against over-reliance on China, whose Ream upgrades have drawn US sanctions concerns. Allowing US access could secure aid, with USAID flows resuming post-conflict, and position Cambodia as a neutral player in US-China rivalry.


Economic and Security Benefits: US presence could bring infrastructure funding, training, and equipment. Historical US aid (e.g., $120 million in 2025 before a brief halt) supports de-mining and naval exercises. In exchange, Cambodia gains leverage in disputes like the Funan Techo Canal, which threatens Vietnamese and Thai interests but aligns with US efforts to counter Chinese influence.



3. Potential Challenges and Risks


Domestic and Constitutional Backlash: Any perceived violation could spark protests or legal challenges, as seen with opposition leader Sam Rainsy's criticism of Chinese access as breaching the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements. Framing US involvement as "non-permanent" mitigates this, but nationalists might view it as sovereignty erosion.



Regional Tensions: Thailand and Vietnam, both wary of US encirclement, could escalate. Thailand's conservative military-monarchy establishment sees Cambodian-US ties as provocative, especially amid claims of US bases fueling anti-Thai sentiment. China, Cambodia's largest creditor (40% of $10 billion debt), might retaliate by withholding support for Ream or other projects.



US Domestic Politics: With the 2025 ceasefire brokered by President Trump, US involvement hinges on administration priorities. Critics like analyst Brian Berletic argue the US engineered the conflict to insert itself, but overcommitment could strain resources amid Pacific pivots.


4. Feasibility in the Current Context



Short-Term Steps: Build on 2025 INDOPACOM dialogues and US monitoring of the Thai border. Expand CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) exercises, dormant since 2017, to include rotational US forces.


Long-Term Outlook: If the Thai conflict persists, Cambodia could lease facilities (e.g., similar to China's alleged 30-year Ream deal) under "build-operate-transfer" models, as with the Funan Techo Canal. Satellite imagery and leaks suggest flexibility—Ream hosts Chinese ships "rotationally," and Cambodia has invited Japanese and US vessels post-2025 renovations.



In summary, Cambodia can accommodate US military bases by redefining them as temporary, joint, or multilateral arrangements, leveraging its constitution's ambiguities. This aligns with Hun Manet's balancing act but risks intensifying regional rivalries. As of August 2025, amid the Thai ceasefire and US-brokered talks, such a move appears increasingly viable for deterring threats and securing aid, though it demands careful diplomacy to avoid alienating China or violating sovereignty norms.

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