ការបង្កើតសន្តិភាព ឬការលេងអំណាច? ការប្រកួតប្រជែងរបស់សហរដ្ឋអាមេរិក និងចិនសម្រាប់ឥទ្ធិពលសកល

 

There is one notable element of the July 28 ceasefire meeting in Kuala Lumpur between Cambodia and Thailand under the auspices of the ASEAN Chair, Malaysia: the participation of senior representatives from both the U.S. and China. China’s mediating role in the conflict between its two immediate neighbors, which also have cultivated growing economic and defense ties with Beijing, is far from unexpected. In contrast, the active mediation of the U.S. in the Thai-Cambodian border conflict is unprecedented considering U.S. President Donald Trump’s America First doctrine, characterized by domesticism, deep skepticism toward global governance and international institutions, and indifference to regions viewed as ‘peripheral’ to U.S. immediate interests, such as Southeast Asia.

Does the peacemaking scene in Kuala Lumpur signal the strategic quest for global leadership between the U.S. and China? The answer is mixed and multifaceted depending on the politico-economic contexts, the region concerned, and the time horizon. In other words, the Sino-American race for global leadership in peacemaking will be haphazard and piecemeal, rather than the planned and alternative grand visions of peace and the broader political orders as seen in the U.S. and the Soviet Union’s involvements in regional armed conflicts during the Cold War.

China’s pursuit of a key role in global peacebuilding is a long-term strategy predating President Xi Jinping through the higher contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations and overall active peacemaking diplomacy in recent years based on respecting state sovereignty, the concept of “building a community with a shared future for mankind,” and economic development. However, the intensity of peacemaking efforts and activism of China has been selective, with the emphasis on the neighboring regions and states with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments, while demonstrating largely rhetorical gestures in other conflicts like those in Ukraine and Gaza.

With his eyes on the Nobel Peace Prize, the time horizon of Trump’s peacemaking activism is unpredictable and perhaps even short-lived. In contrast to China’s approach to global peacemaking or the earlier U.S. administrations’ emphasis on liberal internationalism, Trump’s way of making peace is value-neutral and transactional, as witnessed in his use of a ‘tariff card’ to bring Cambodia and Thailand to the negotiating table. At the same time, his personal goal of winning the Nobel Peace Prize means that the intensity of Trump’s peacemaking diplomacy is less likely to be region-specific, with the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Gabon, Israel, Pakistan, and Rwanda backing the Nobel Peace Prize for Trump.

The implications of peacebuilding activism of the U.S. and China for the conflict-affected states, territories, and people will not be uniform. The varying outcomes as well as the intensity of their involvements will rest on the three aforementioned variables—the politico-economic contexts, the region concerned, and the time horizon—alongside the resilience of the states, regional institutions, and the populations in question. Standard International Relations (IR) theoretical accounts may apply to conflict-affected, yet stable states with relatively broad popular support. However, eclecticism is essential in both theory and practice with regard to a comprehensive peace resolution for states with illegitimate de facto authorities and marginalized and persecuted populations. In these scenarios, the elite-based peace deals based on transactional approaches of the U.S. or traditional state sovereignty-based approaches of China will be unsustainable, at best, and more oppressive for ordinary people, at worst.

The Sino-American intervention was constructive, albeit imperfect, in the Thai-Cambodian border conflict, where their direct stakes are minimal. However, conflicts like the South China Sea dispute present a complex scenario in which China is a direct claimant with an assertive posture and the U.S. State Department, housing influential neoconservative figures headed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, has explicit geopolitical interests, including countering China’s rise with tougher U.S. policies. In this scenario, the impacts of active great power involvements are less likely to be straightforward in terms of a comprehensive resolution that represents interests of all stakeholders involved with the varying impacts on the autonomy of the ASEAN and concerned Southeast Asian states. Given the relative policy consistency of China and successive U.S. administrations since the late 2010s, hedging between the U.S. and China is likely to be the default position of most regional states. Despite the preponderant power of the U.S. and China and the internal discord and shifts in policy approaches following presidential elections, such as in the Philippines, the Southeast Asian claimant states are relatively resilient, enjoying relatively broad popular legitimacy and having the capacity to mobilize state power and national resources for respective foreign policy objectives.

The haphazard quest for global leadership in peacemaking between the U.S. and China will be more pressing for vulnerable states with oppressive and unpopular authoritarian regimes, interethnic conflicts, and suboptimal and unrepresentative resource management schemes, such as Myanmar. As an immediate neighbor with tangible security and economic interests, China has played a pivotal role in shaping Myanmar’s peace process, leveraging its substantial influence on different stakeholders, including the Myanmar military and some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), for years. Compared to China, the U.S. has played a less direct role in Myanmar’s politico-security trajectory apart from imposing sanctions on the junta and providing non-lethal aid and assistance to various resistance forces. The nature of the Sino-American rivalry in Myanmar has for decades mirrored what is observed elsewhere in Southeast Asia and is not as severe as the one between the Western liberal states and Russia over Ukraine.

As has been the case in many regions rich in strategic materials, the situation could shift with the growing importance of rare earths, which can be found in opposition-held territories in Myanmar. Amid the intensifying Sino-American trade war, the Trump administration has been presented with competing proposals regarding the potential access to Myanmar’s rare earths in Kachin State. Meanwhile, China has pressured the KIA, the Kachin EAO, to retreat from the strategic town of Bhamo through the threats of halting all rare earth imports from the KIA-controlled territories. While the uncertainty persists over the potential extent of Sino-American competition over Myanmar’s rare earths, there is one certainty. The fact remains that neither the American short-term transaction-driven mediation nor China’s state sovereignty-based and piecemeal ceasefire deals can deliver sustainable peace in Myanmar. In fact, such partial peace deals without the active participation of grassroots groupings and the general populace can even exacerbate the existing inequalities, intergroup tensions, and the oppression of civilian populations.

The Sino-American peacemaking activism, particularly under Trump, can better be viewed as a haphazard rivalry than a well-orchestrated competition over global leadership. The unique politico-economic contexts, the concerned region, and the time horizon will decide whether and to what extent they engage in peacemaking diplomacy. History shows that the very notion and state of peace can serve as a currency of power for great powers in their quest for respective geopolitical ends. Hence, it rests on the autonomy and political acumen of small states and their populations to cultivate their own peace and protect their interests. While stable states with relatively broad popular legitimacy can more effectively adopt appropriate policies toward great powers, weak states mired with oppressive autocracies and competing authorities are more susceptible to a myriad of vulnerabilities to the detriment of ordinary civilians.

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