មេរៀន​ពី​មូលដ្ឋាន​ទ័ព​អាមេរិក​ក្នុង​ប្រទេស​ហ្វីលីពីន ដែល​កម្ពុជា​អាច​រៀន

 Analysis: Lessons from US Military Bases in the Philippines That Cambodia Can Learn




Cambodia, amid its 2025 border conflict with Thailand and efforts to balance ties with China and the US, could draw valuable insights from the Philippines' experience with US military presence. The Philippines has hosted US forces under frameworks like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) since 2014, evolving from permanent bases (closed in 1992) to rotational access at nine sites as of 2025. This arrangement has bolstered Manila's security amid South China Sea (SCS) tensions with China but also sparked domestic debates on sovereignty and dependency. Below is a structured analysis of key lessons, based on historical and current dynamics, tailored to Cambodia's context—where the 1993 Constitution prohibits foreign bases, yet rotational or joint access remains feasible.



1. Historical Context: Evolution of US-Philippine Military Ties


The US maintained major bases like Subic Bay and Clark Air Base post-World War II until 1992, when the Philippine Senate rejected lease renewal amid anti-imperialist sentiment and the Mt. Pinatubo eruption's destruction. This closure highlighted the risks of over-reliance on foreign powers, leading to a security vacuum that China exploited in the SCS.


Revival via EDCA in 2014 (expanded to nine sites in 2023) allows rotational US deployments for training, disaster response, and deterrence, without permanent basing—framed as mutual defense under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. As of 2025, joint exercises like Balikatan involve thousands of troops, enhancing interoperability amid Chinese incursions.


Lesson for Cambodia: Phnom Penh's constitution similarly bans permanent bases, but the EDCA model shows how "rotational access" can circumvent such prohibitions. Cambodia could adapt this for facilities like Ream Naval Base, inviting US forces for exercises without violating Article 53, as seen in recent US Navy visits to Sihanoukville in December 2024.


2. Positive Lessons: Security and Economic Benefits


Deterrence Against Regional Threats: The Philippines has leveraged US presence to counter Chinese aggression in the SCS, with EDCA sites enabling rapid response and intelligence sharing. For instance, US access to northern Luzon bases deters threats near Taiwan and disputed reefs. This has emboldened Manila in international arbitration, securing a 2016 Hague ruling against China.


Application to Cambodia: Facing Thai military superiority (e.g., US-supplied F-16s used in the 2025 border clashes), Cambodia could use US rotational forces to deter aggression over Preah Vihear or Gulf resources. Recent US monitoring of the August 2025 ceasefire demonstrates this potential, mirroring Philippine gains in stability.


Economic and Infrastructure Gains: US cooperation brings funding for base upgrades, military aid (over $500 million annually to the Philippines), and humanitarian projects. EDCA has funded construction at sites like Basa Air Base, improving local economies and disaster resilience—crucial in typhoon-prone areas.


Application to Cambodia: With Chinese debt burdens (40% of $10 billion external debt), US involvement could diversify aid, funding de-mining or canal projects like Funan Techo. The US Indo-Pacific Command's July 2025 dialogues with Cambodian officials focused on joint training, offering similar modernization benefits.


Diplomatic Leverage: EDCA has strengthened the Philippines' position in ASEAN and with allies like Japan and Australia, fostering minilateral partnerships (e.g., US-Philippines-Japan trilateral in 2024).


Application to Cambodia: Under Prime Minister Hun Manet, closer US ties could balance Chinese influence at Ream, enhancing Phnom Penh's bargaining power in regional forums amid SCS-like disputes with Vietnam.



3. Negative Lessons: Sovereignty, Domestic, and Geopolitical Risks


Sovereignty and Public Backlash: Historical grievances, including US bombings during the Vietnam War and abandoned Amerasian children (estimated 50,000 post-1992), fuel protests against EDCA. Leftist groups decry it as neo-colonialism, with polls showing mixed support amid fears of US overreach.


Application to Cambodia: Similar war-era traumas (US bombings killing up to 150,000 Cambodians) could ignite opposition, as seen in criticisms of Chinese Ream access. Allowing US presence risks protests from nationalists or figures like Sam Rainsy, eroding Hun Manet's legitimacy.


Escalation and Dependency Risks: EDCA has drawn the Philippines deeper into US-China rivalry, with incidents like the 2025 Second Thomas Shoal standoff risking broader conflict. Manila's reliance on US aid has limited foreign policy autonomy, as evidenced by Duterte's 2020 VFA abrogation threat (later reversed).


Application to Cambodia: Inviting US forces could provoke China—Cambodia's top investor—leading to economic retaliation or halted Ream upgrades. The 2025 Thai conflict, pitting a US ally against a China-backed Cambodia, underscores how bases might escalate tensions rather than resolve them.


Implementation Challenges: Early EDCA progress stalled under Duterte (2016–2022) due to pro-China shifts, highlighting political volatility. Bases require ongoing negotiations, with environmental and social impacts (e.g., displacement near sites).


Application to Cambodia: Domestic politics, including elite factions tied to China, could hinder sustained cooperation. Cambodia's weaker military infrastructure (shallow ports) might limit benefits, as noted in analyses of its "geographical limitations."


4. Applicability to Cambodia's Current Context


Opportunities for Adaptation: As of August 2025, Cambodia's warming US ties—via Defense Secretary Austin's 2024 visit and resumed exchanges—mirror the Philippines' pre-EDCA pivot. By framing access as "temporary" or UN-aligned (e.g., for peacekeeping), Cambodia could learn from EDCA's non-permanent model to modernize forces without constitutional amendments.


Caveats and Recommendations: Unlike the Philippines' treaty alliance, Cambodia lacks formal US commitments, necessitating cautious steps like expanding CARAT exercises. To mitigate risks, Phnom Penh should prioritize transparency, local benefits, and diversified partnerships (e.g., with Japan, as in Ream invitations).



Broader Regional Implications: Southeast Asia's non-alignment ethos means US presence in Cambodia could unsettle ASEAN unity, similar to EDCA's ripple effects on Vietnam and Indonesia.


In summary, the Philippines' EDCA experience teaches Cambodia that US military cooperation can provide deterrence and aid but at the cost of sovereignty debates and geopolitical entanglements. By adopting rotational frameworks, Cambodia could hedge against threats like Thailand while avoiding full dependency, though success depends on navigating China ties and domestic politics. This balanced approach aligns with Hun Manet's "smart diplomacy" but demands learning from Manila's pitfalls to prevent escalation in an already tense region.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

បញ្ហារបស់កម្ពុជា ងាកទៅរកចិន

Image
 And What It Means for Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Chinese President Xi Jinping smiles next to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in Phnom Penh, October 2016.  When Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen claimed a landslide victory in the country’s July 29 elections, most international observers quickly denounced the results as rigged. Given that the election has helped consolidate Hun Sen’s 33-year, increasingly authoritarian hold on power, these accusations are troubling. Even more troubling, however, may be Hun Sen’s recent tilt toward China and the increasing local and regional benefits Beijing is receiving from its relationship with Cambodia. For myriad reasons, Washington has long considered Cambodia a strategic lost cause. Yet the country’s Chinese turn should serve as a warning of what China’s growing economic presence, especially in authoritarian countries, will mean for Southeast Asia and Eurasia more broadly. To respond effectively, the United States and its allies n...
Read more

ទស្សនៈ​អ្នក​វិភាគ៖ ហានិភ័យ​សេដ្ឋកិច្ច​នៃ​ជម្លោះ​ព្រំដែន​កម្ពុជា​ជាមួយ​ថៃ

 Analysts' Perspectives: Economic Risks of Cambodia's Border Dispute with Thailand As of August 19, 2025, the ongoing border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand—escalating with skirmishes in May, airstrikes in July, and a shaky ceasefire—has drawn significant concern from analysts regarding its economic implications for Cambodia. Drawing from reports by Mekong Strategic Capital, EuroCham Cambodia, and other experts, the conflict poses short-term risks to GDP growth, trade, tourism, remittances, and investment. While Cambodia's economy shows resilience through low debt and diversification potential, prolonged tensions could exacerbate vulnerabilities in an already trade-dependent nation. Below is a synthesized analysis based on recent assessments. Overview of the Dispute's Economic Context The dispute centers on historical border claims, including areas near the Preah Vihear temple, and has led to border closures, trade restrictions, and nationalist sentiments disrupti...
Read more

ការបង្កើតសន្តិភាព ឬការលេងអំណាច? ការប្រកួតប្រជែងរបស់សហរដ្ឋអាមេរិក និងចិនសម្រាប់ឥទ្ធិពលសកល

Image
  There is one notable element of the July 28 ceasefire meeting in Kuala Lumpur between Cambodia and Thailand under the auspices of the ASEAN Chair, Malaysia: the participation of senior representatives from both the U.S. and China. China’s mediating role in the conflict between its two immediate neighbors, which also have cultivated growing economic and defense ties with Beijing, is far from unexpected. In contrast, the active mediation of the U.S. in the Thai-Cambodian border conflict is unprecedented considering U.S. President Donald Trump’s America First doctrine, characterized by domesticism, deep skepticism toward global governance and international institutions, and indifference to regions viewed as ‘peripheral’ to U.S. immediate interests, such as Southeast Asia. Does the peacemaking scene in Kuala Lumpur signal the strategic quest for global leadership between the U.S. and China? The answer is mixed and multifaceted depending on the politico-economic contexts, the region c...
Read more