សន្តិភាពថៃ-កម្ពុជា / សន្តិភាពរបស់លោក Trump

 The Thai–Cambodian peace accord marks the end of months of border conflict, with Trump’s intervention emerging as a decisive geopolitical factor.

To begin with, it is indeed heartening that the leaders of Thailand and Cambodia have managed to reach an understanding that will lead to lasting peace between the two nations on October 26, 2025, bringing an end to the conflict that had persisted since late July. Both sides have acknowledged that this marks “the end of their ongoing hostility.”

However, several observations can be made regarding the outcome of this peace agreement:

The success of the peace accord on October 26 must be attributed largely to the “Trump factor”—a crucial influence behind the achievement.

The involvement of the “Trump factor” helped break the deadlock in negotiations between the two countries, preventing the dispute from dragging on. However, detailed implementation still lies ahead.

As has long been noted, the conflict and its resolution are inherently “multilateral” in nature, involving multiple actors such as the United States, China, and Malaysia. The dispute is therefore not purely “bilateral” between Thailand and Cambodia.

Had the United States not intervened directly, China’s role might have been more prominent. Indeed, during the initial ceasefire signing in August, China participated as one of the observers. Hence, it will be worth observing China’s role going forward, particularly after US President Donald Trump’s decisive “cutting-in manoeuvre” in this case.

Malaysia’s mediating role also deserves recognition, likely due to its position as ASEAN chair this year—credit that must go to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. It also highlights ASEAN’s constructive role in conflict resolution.

President Trump’s participation in the ASEAN Summit underscores the tangible emergence of geopolitical factors in Southeast Asia’s regional affairs.

The statement issued in Malaysia was a “joint declaration” between the two leaders and the concerned states. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as an international treaty requiring parliamentary approval. Otherwise, leaders participating in international forums would never be able to issue joint statements reflecting shared positions. (Hardline factions in Thai politics opposing this matter may need to better understand this distinction.)

Although the resolution process is multilateral, mechanisms to address local border issues must still rely on bilateral frameworks, guided by the memorandums of understanding signed in 2000 and 2001. These continue to serve as essential frameworks for operational cooperation.

The establishment of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) to monitor the ceasefire is another significant outcome—likely to be more effective than the previous two-team arrangement that placed observers separately on each side of the border.

Thailand’s four key demands were acknowledged at the Malaysian meeting. However, the actual implementation remains to be worked out through various mechanisms: the withdrawal of heavy weapons and mine clearance fall under the military-level RBC framework; the development of border management plans belongs to the JBC; and cross-border crime suppression—including scam networks—will likely require coordination at the government level, perhaps beyond the GBC’s scope.

Following the Malaysia meeting, the real challenge lies in ensuring that the RBC mechanism achieves tangible military outcomes.

On the technical front, the JBC meeting in Chanthaburi—chaired by Ambassador Prasat Prasatwinijchai—reached concrete conclusions, particularly on the use of LiDAR technology for mapping and addressing disputes in the Ban Nong Chan and Nong Ya Kaew areas.

Moving forward, both nations must work to restore Thai–Cambodian relations to normalcy. This includes revitalising life along the border and reopening checkpoints, while inevitably addressing nationalist sentiments on both sides.

Conclusion

The success in ending the Thai–Cambodian conflict—largely driven by President Trump’s intervention—invites deeper reflection on the geopolitical factors shaping today’s world. It also challenges Thailand’s long-held belief in resolving disputes purely through bilateral means, which may no longer hold true in the current global political landscape.

This outcome should encourage both the Thai state and society to understand and reassess the broader impact of “international influences” with greater insight and realism.

thailand fake